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1. Introduction
Biolinguistics, construed broadly as the study of human language from multiple bi-
ological viewpoints, was first placed on a solid modern foundation by Eric Lenne-
berg’s impressive Biological Foundations of Language in 1967. Lenneberg conceived of
our capacity to acquire language as a species-typical aspect of human cognition—a
conception so widespread today that it is difficult to realize how radical it seemed
to many at the time. Although Lenneberg argued that our language capacity has
some species-typical genetic and neural components, he clearly recognized that it
has a huge learned, culture-specific component as well. Lenneberg had thus al-
ready leap-frogged the unproductive “nature versus nurture” dichotomy that has
bedevilled so many debates about language since that time. He also recognized
that human language differs in important ways from animal communication, and
raised the question of whether the roots of language are best sought in cogni-
tion or communication—another prominent preoccupation in modern debates. In
short, although he apparently did not adopt the term “biolinguistics” himself, Eric
Lenneberg can rightly be seen as an important founding father of contemporary
biolinguistics. This makes a celebration in this journal, fifty years later, of his mag-
num opus highly appropriate.
In this essay, I will first briefly discuss a few of Lenneberg’s many insights
that I think bear repeating today. Then, I turn to a discussion of modern empirical
developments in biolinguistics that I think Lenneberg would find welcome, and in
many cases surprising, were he alive today. I will thus focus less on the aspects of
Lenneberg’s thought that have stood the test of time well, and are still essentially
correct today (which covers many of them) and more on aspects where modern
data invite a reconsideration of some of his ideas. These come from three general
areas: comparative investigations, modern neuroscience and especially molecular
genetics. My goal is to provide a concise overview of those developments that I
believe, were Lenneberg to appear for a conversation about biolinguistics today, he
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would find most fascinating and in some cases challenging, and to speculate about
how he might respond.
2. Lenneberg’s Insights
I will first highlight some of Lenneberg’s central insights into the biology of lan-
guage, especially those which appear to have been overlooked in some modern
debates. There are many such insights (as well as those where his conceptions,
although radical in their time, have become widely accepted), so my selection is
personal, and far from comprehensive. I hope that this brief selection inspires con-
temporary students of biolinguistics to read (or re-read) Lenneberg.
Most crucially, I see Lenneberg’s perspective on the biological nature of lan-
guage acquisition as cutting through some of the most protracted and unproductive
debates that continue to rage about language, in particular debates about the roles
of genes, environment and culture in language. Lenneberg recognized all of these
factors as playing important roles, but did not shy away from highlighting the fact
that the human capacity for language is part of human biology and not simply a
product of our environment. Starting with the environment, he saw its role as sup-
portive and permissive, but not crucial. In a nice metaphor, he points out that a
frog’s and a minnow’s eggs, developing in the same pond, will reliably yield quite
different developmental outcomes (Lenneberg 1967: 373). Of course, the proper
nutrients, water, oxygen etc. are needed, but these factors do not determine the
outcome: The genetic code and biological aspects of development contained in the
eggs at fertilization do. Given this obvious biological fact, why should we be sur-
prised that a human child and a kitten (or a chimpanzee) raised in identical environ-
ments should yield different developmental outcomes? The “language-readiness”
of the newborn human brain is part of human biology, even if the particular and
idiosyncratic end-state reached by any particular individual also obviously incor-
porates their personal social and environmental history.
Turning to the social and cultural environment, he considered a proper nor-
mal social environment to be crucial, but again not instructive in a literal “teaching”
sense. Indeed he already was aware that parent’s attempts to teach their children
specific rules (or to avoid certain words or phrases) are surprisingly ineffective. Ac-
quiring language is not like learning proper etiquette from Miss Manners. Nonethe-
less, recognizing the centrality of an appropriate linguistic input, he conceptualized
the child as “resonating” with this input, rather than memorizing it by rote (see
Hoshi, this issue). Cognitively, these led Lenneberg to a conception of “language as
a special form of pattern recognition” typical of the human brain, pattern recogni-
tion that “can’t be accomplished based on probability statistics alone” (Lenneberg
1967: 393).
He explores this idea about resonance in detail, hypothesizing that childhood
provides a limited (and again species-specific) period during which the individual
is optimally capable of acquiring one or more languages with little effort. This
plasticity of childhood is then stabilized at puberty, and the representations formed
then undergo consolidation for the rest of an individual’s life. Lenneberg can thus
be seen as one of the first to recognize the importance of “critical period phenom-
ena” in language acquisition. Today, this is a central and well-accepted concept in
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child language acquisition, although the more nuanced modern conception, often
termed “sensitive periods,” acknowledges the more gradual “closing” of the period
than the slamming shut at puberty portrayed by Lenneberg. And, again taking an
essentially modern biological viewpoint, he recognizes that there is nothing sur-
prising or special about such critical periods: We find them everywhere in biology,
from bird imprinting to cat visual development, and human sensitive periods are
just one more example.
Also impressive is Lenneberg’s conception of the potential nature of “uni-
versal” properties of human languages. He clearly recognizes that these must be
abstract properties that depend on the universality of the cognitive mechanisms
underlying language, and not either the categories or operations seen more super-
ficially in particular languages. It is thus ironic that several recent critiques of the
notion of language universals and “universal grammar” have unabashedly taken
on the latter rather than the former (e.g., Everett 2005, Tomasello 2005, Evans &
Levinson 2009). These critics seek, and then reject the existence of, superficial
commonalities, rather than considering the deeper cognitive commonalities that
Lenneberg and Chomsky, at around the same time (Chomsky 1965), had in mind
when discussing “universal grammar”. Contemporary critics also often neglect the
kind of statistical or implicational universals, discussed extensively at around the
same time by Greenberg and many others (Greenberg 1963, Greenberg, Osgood &
Jenkins 1966). This is an example of the dictum that those who fail to learn from
history are doomed to repeat it (cf. Fitch 2011).
Finally, Lenneberg weighs in on two central topics in modern debates con-
cerning language evolution. First, considering arguments about the relative im-
portance of peripheral anatomy vs. central cognition in the capacity for language,
he comes down clearly on the central side: Neurophysiological factors are central
(Lenneberg 1967: 57). But, Lenneberg argues, these central factors are not simply a
product of brain size, given that nanocephalic dwarves with brains within the ape
size range can possess normal language. The implication is that we cannot use cra-
nial capacity, or other measures obtainable from the fossil record, as an indication
of when language arose, or clues as to what its earlier form(s) might have been (cf.
Fitch 2009).
Second, in chapter 8 Lenneberg considers and rejects arguments about lin-
guistic relativity made by Benjamin Whorf and others. Although many superfi-
cial differences between languages exist in vocabulary, grammatical categories, and
many other factors, and these may effect communication, they do not change the
central capacity for conceptualization. He concludes that language depends on
cognition much more than cognition depends on language.
As mentioned, this is just a taste of the many insights Lenneberg presents in
his book. Some of these insights (e.g. regarding critical periods, or the idea that the
language-ready brain is part of human biology) have been widely accepted today,
at least among academics in the relevant disciplines. Others (e.g. concerning the
nature of language universals, or the centrality of cognitive factors) are still debated
and/or remain inadequately appreciated by some, even fifty years later. But in my
opinion, in all of these cases, Lenneberg was clearly on the right track.
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3. How far Have We Come? Biolinguistics Today
Above I highlighted areas where Lenneberg would be either pleased to see his ideas
accepted or alternately would roll his eyes at how issues and dichotomies he had
already cogently resolved continue to be debated today. I now turn to three areas
where I think Lenneberg would be pleasantly surprised at the progress we have
made in researching the biological foundations of language. These are comparative
biology and animal cognition in particular, neuroscience (especially brain imag-
ing), and molecular genetics. In all of these areas, I think, Lenneberg would be as-
tounded by how much science has progressed, sometimes in ways consistent with
his arguments and predictions and sometimes less so.
3.1. Comparative Cognition Research
Although Lenneberg considered animal cognition and communication research
briefly, his main concern was distinguishing between these and their human
analogs. He, rightly in my opinion, drew a sharp distinction between animal com-
munication systems known at that time and human language; this was one part
of his argument as to the primacy of cognitive factors rather than communicative
factors in the biology of language. In a detailed discussion of word meanings, he
pointed out (again rightly) that human word meanings are nothing like stimulus-
response reactions to particular things. Rather, words reflect concepts and cate-
gories, often in a very flexible and context-dependent manner (also see Leivada,
this issue). Lenneberg argued that words thus “represent” in a very different way
from the calls of animal communication systems. He cited two examples of this
(Lenneberg 1967: 329–330): A dog trained to “point” at a tree or door in his masters
yard is unable to locate and point to the equivalent referents in a neighbor’s yard;
and a parrot trained to say “goodbye” when people leave the room sometimes do
so when people enter as well. In neither case were any references given, so we must
assume these are anecdotal reports.
Modern research has elaborated upon these ideas, using well-controlled ex-
perimental investigations, in three ways. The first, and perhaps most widely known,
was the discovery that some monkeys do produce alarm calls that have rather
general apparent referents. For example, vervet monkeys produce three differ-
ent alarm call types when seeing different predators: large aerial predators like
eagles, dangerous land predators like leopards, and less-dangerous large snakes
(Struhsaker 1967). Experimental investigations of these calls using playback ex-
periments demonstrated that listening vervets interpret these calls as if they had
spotted the relevant predator type themselves (Seyfarth & Cheney 1980, Seyfarth,
Cheney & Marler 1980, Seyfarth & Cheney 1984). We now know that such predator-
specific alarm calls have evolved, convergently, in many different bird and mammal
species, including chickens, ground squirrels, meerkats, and various other monkey
species (Sherman 1985, Macedonia 1991, Evans, Evans & Marler 1993, Zuberbu¨hler
2001, Manser, Seyfarth & Cheney 2002, Zuberbu¨hler 2003).
Are these the equivalent of “animal words”? There are several good reasons
to think not. Early authors were careful to label these calls “functionally referen-
tial” to indicate that they can be parsed by listeners as evidence about predators,
but this does not entail that signalers intend to communicate the predator’s pres-
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ence to ignorant receivers (Cheney & Seyfarth 1990). Indeed abundant subsequent
work suggests that the latter is not the case, and that indeed monkeys lack a rich
enough “theory of mind” to actively represent the ignorance of their conspecifics
that would be required to hold such an intention (Seyfarth & Cheney 2003, Cheney
& Seyfarth 2007). Thus, it is perfectly possible that, from a signaler’s point of view,
a particular call mainly reflects arousal caused by sighting a predator, but for the
perceiver this functions as an indication of that predator’s presence (cf. Wheeler
& Fischer 2012, Fitch & Zuberbu¨hler 2013). From a modern perspective then, this
particular glass is half-full: it points to a phylogenetic continuity in perceivers (so-
phisticated, inferential, context-dependent interpretation) but a remaining discon-
tinuity in terms of signalers (Seyfarth & Cheney 2014, 2016). Lenneberg would be
fascinated by all this, but point out that the distinction between linguistic meanings
in language and “semantics” of these alarm call remains clear.
Regarding dogs’ ability to interpret meanings, this issue has now been in-
vestigated experimentally in several dogs with extraordinarily large vocabularies
including more than 100 object referents (Kaminski, Call & Fischer 2004, Pilley &
Reid 2011, Griebel & Oller 2012). Two facets of these data are relevant. First, the
border collie “Rico” showed evidence of fast mapping (one trial learning of a word
meaning) and long-term retention of that meaning, although the strength of this
experimental demonstration has been questioned based on results from another
dog (Kaminski, Call & Fischer 2004, Griebel & Oller 2012). Second, another border
collie “Chaser” successfully mastered over 1000 object referents, and unlike Rico
(who simply retrieved named unique objects) could also produce specific transi-
tive actions to these objects, differentiating the three sentences “nose ball”, “paw
ball”, and “bring ball”. Chaser could also use names to refer to categories like
“toy” or “ball” that applied to many different objects (Expt. 3, Pilley & Reid 2011).
This both shows that dogs are not limited to learning specific object-word pairs, as
Lenneberg had claimed, but also have a productive ability to map from utterances
to action-object pairings. Lenneberg argues that proper names are in some sense
a degenerate form of word meaning (given their typical pairing with specific indi-
viduals), and these dog experiments pair specific words with specific objects, and
could thus also be seen as degenerate “proper names”. But the understanding of
novel object/action pairings documented for Chaser belie Lenneberg’s argument
that the productive, creative ability to understand novel combinations is unique to
humans.
Finally, and for me most convincingly, the results from language-trained
African gray parrots experimentally demonstrate both flexible, context-dependent
interpretation of meaning (including adjectives like shape, color, material, and num-
ber) and appropriate productive usage of these abstract categories (Pepperberg
1981, Pepperberg & Brezinsky 1991, Pepperberg 1999). Although many parrots
learn to imitate speech, the meaningful comprehension and use of words requires
special training (the model-rival paradigm), and few parrots have successfully un-
dergone this intensive procedure, which more closely resembles child language ac-
quisition than more typical training procedures (Pepperberg 1985). Although in the
parrot case both vocal imitation and its meaningful deployment are clearly the re-
sult of convergent evolution, they nonetheless belie Lenneberg’s arguments about
human-typical usage of meaning being unique to our species: Important compo-
nents of this are found in multiple other species.
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What would Lenneberg’s reaction to these data be? First, he would correctly
point out that in all of these cases, it appears that the “semantic” behaviors ex-
hibited by non-human animals evolved convergently relative to our own. Even
regarding nonhuman primates, we have no evidence for predator-specific alarm
calls in great apes, so the presence of such calls in some monkeys is not evidence
that they were present in our common ancestor with these monkeys. Nonetheless,
these data clearly show that Lenneberg’s claims of “unique to man” are incorrect.
More importantly, although Lenneberg recognized that repeated convergent evo-
lution can provide evidence about adaptive function (Chapters 1 and 9), he does
not seem to recognize that such analogies are also relevant to testing mechanistic
hypotheses, for example hypotheses regarding the brain mechanisms needed to
perform these feats (for dogs see e.g. Andics et al. 2014, Andics et al. 2016). Al-
though only homology can be used to infer phylogenetic trajectories, as Lenneberg
realized, this does not make analogy irrelevant (cf. Fitch 2010, 2017).
I think that these modern data steals the wind from the sails of Lenneberg’s
critique of Otto Koehler, with whom Lenneberg only partially agreed (1967: 232). In
fact, Koehler was one of the first to persuasively argue for a multi-component per-
spective on the biology of language (Koehler 1951, 1954). Today, a multi-component
approach to biolinguistics, including animal cognition as a key ingredient, is widely
seen as the most promising comparative framework within which to consider the
evolution of language (Hauser, Chomsky & Fitch 2002, Fitch, Hauser & Chomsky
2005, Fitch 2017); I suspect that given today’s data Lenneberg would concur.
3.2. Neuroscience and Brain Imaging
I think that modern progress in neuroscientific methodology would have pleased
(and astounded) Lenneberg. In his day, essentially the only neural data relevant
to language came from either clinical anomalies (like the genetic dwarfism that
he highlighted) or patients suffering from brain lesions. In the latter case, there
were no methods like computed tomography (CT) scans or magnetic resonance
imaging (MRI) to probe brain anatomy in living individuals, so investigation relied
either on clinical signs (e.g. hemiparesis) or post-mortem dissection. Thus, the
degree to which Lenneberg could interpret data from his observations of living
patients in terms of lesion location was extremely limited. Indeed he is somewhat
dismissive of the relevance of localized lesions. Although he worked with Norman
Geschwind’s patients (Lenneberg 1967: 196), he mentions Geschwind’s then new
but now classic 1965 paper, defending the importance of the arcuate fasiculus in
connecting frontal and temporal regions, only in passing as “an opposite point of
view” (Lenneberg 1967: 217), without further discussion. In a book which leaves
few stones unturned, this is a surprising dismissal.
Since the 1970s and the introduction of CT scans, and then later MRI, neu-
rolinguists have benefited from a much richer and more accurate means of de-
termining lesion location and of linking it to a patient’s symptoms. The result
has been a revival, with modifications, of the older models of Broca, Wernicke,
and Lichtheim which attempted to localize particular sub-components of language
(such as producing vs. understanding speech, or processing syntax) to particular
brain regions (Geschwind 1970, Caramazza & Zurif 1976, Damasio & Geschwind
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1984, Damasio & Damasio 1992). The later introduction of positron emission to-
mography (PET) and functional MRI (fMRI), which allowed measurement of brain
activity in living patients, further amplified this localizationist trend. Although
sometimes veering into “neo-phrenology” (cf. Blumstein 1979, Friston 2002), there
can be little doubt that these modern brain imaging methods have provided a
massive new source of relevant data, and have strongly influenced contemporary
neuro-linguistics. Lenneberg would be amazed.
Lenneberg might have been less impressed with the various theoretical edi-
fices which have been built up around this new font of neurolinguistic data, because
some make little contact with findings from linguistics, and even those that do of-
ten adopt radically different theoretical approaches (compare, for example, Ullman
2001, Hagoort 2005, Price 2010, Friederici 2011, Rogalsky & Hickok 2011). Given
that Lenneberg’s book ends with an appendix by Noam Chomsky detailing formal
considerations for evaluating computational approaches to language, Lenneberg
might be disappointed to see how rarely formal and computational linguistic con-
siderations play a role in current discussions of the neural basis of language.
To briefly consider a neurolinguistic approach that does take formal and com-
putational considerations seriously, consider the recent brain imaging work of An-
gela Friederici and colleagues (Bahlmann, Schubotz & Friederici 2008, Bahlmann
et al. 2009, Friederici 2011, 2012, 2017). Starting with two well-defined artificial
grammars (a finite-state and context-free grammar), these researchers first found
that different frontal regions were activated in participants trained to process the
two grammars (Friederici et al. 2006). Furthermore, these two regions were con-
nected to the temporal cortex by very different white matter tracts: the frontal op-
erculum (activated by the simpler grammar) was mainly connected via a ventral
pathway, while the portion of Broca’s area activated by the context-free grammar
(Brodmann area [BA] 44) was connected by a dorsal pathway roughly equivalent
to Geschwind’s arcuate fasiculus (Friederici et al. 2006). Later experiments showed
the same region activated by a strictly hierarchical, center-embedded grammar,
suggesting that this activation is not due to any simpler strategy, like counting, be-
ing adopted to process the context-free grammar (Bahlmann, Schubotz & Friederici
2008), and that the same region is increasingly activated by increasingly complex
syntactic constructions in German (Makuuchi et al. 2009).
The conclusion that portions of Broca’s region play a key role in processing
syntax, whether in natural language or in various more artificial tasks, was veri-
fied in a meta-analysis (Friederici 2011) as well as numerous experiments in other
laboratories (Pallier, Devauchelle & Dehaene 2011, Udde´n & Bahlmann 2012, Ha-
goort 2014, Dehaene et al. 2015). It remains unclear to what degree this rather
broad region is specifically involved in linguistic syntax (as opposed to, say, musi-
cal syntax), but that at least portions play a key role in processing language appears
indubitable (Koelsch et al. 2002, Fazio et al. 2009, Fedorenko, Duncan & Kanwisher
2013, Fitch & Martins 2014). For a dissenting view, see Rogalsky & Hickok (2011).
This brain imaging research also makes a fascinating connection to neuro-
anatomical work in nonhuman primates. Direct cytoarchitectonically guided com-
parisons between Broca’s region in human and chimpanzee post-mortem brains
shows that this area is the most enlarged cortical region known in the human brain,
with left BA 45 six times and left BA 44 6.6 times larger in humans than in chim-
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panzees (Schenker et al. 2010). Although the entire human brain is three times
larger than a chimpanzee’s, primary sensory regions are not greatly enlarged: pri-
mary visual cortex is only 1.8 times larger in humans than chimpanzees (Schenker
et al. 2010). Furthermore, these areas are much more heavily connected, via a dor-
sal pathway, to a much wider swathe of parietal and temporal cortex in humans
(Rilling et al. 2008).
This combination of comparative and neuroimaging data have led me to sug-
gest that Broca’s region plays the computational role of a “stack”, a form of auxil-
iary memory required for processing of grammars above the finite-state or “regu-
lar” level (Fitch 2014). According to this “dendrophilia hypothesis” (Fitch 2014), the
enlargement of Broca’s region greatly expanded the capacity of this auxiliary mem-
ory, and its drastically increased connectivity increased its ability to serve multiple
functions for multiple brain regions (rather than being limited to a single modality
or cognitive domain). I believe that, whether this hypothesis turns out to be correct
in its details or not, it is the kind of hypothesis Lenneberg would favor if he were
alive today, given his emphasis on a broad range of biological data consistent with
linguistic theory.
Two other neurolinguistic issues raised by Lenneberg deserve emphasis. One
is his emphasis, typical at that time, on the importance of cerebral asymmetry in hu-
man language, and in particular the left hemisphere bias observed in some aspects
of language processing. This degree of left bias was thought by many at the time to
be unique to humans. For example:
The phenomenon of cerebral dominance—that is, the predominant im-
portance of one side of the brain for a class of learned behavior—occurs,
as far as we know, in no mammal other than man.
(Geschwind 1970: 944)
Geschwind was careful to say “in no mammal” because it was already known
from the work of Fernando Nottebohm that song control in some birds was left-
lateralized (Nottebohm 1971). In any case, it is now clear that cerebral asymmetry is
found, and indeed appears to be typical, in a wide variety of vertebrates including
fish, birds and mammals (Bisazza, Rogers & Vallortigara 1998, Vallortigara 2000,
Rogers & Andrew 2002). To the extent that aspects of human language are lateral-
ized, they are not unique or even unusual in this respect, compared to perceptual
processes in vertebrates in general, or primates in particular (cf. Fitch & Braccini
2013).
In contrast, an observation emphasized by Lenneberg that seems to have held
up today concerns the significance of absolute brain size for linguistic ability. Cit-
ing the clinical work of Seckel on nanocephalic dwarfism (Seckel 1960), in which
humans have very small brains in the range of chimpanzees but nonetheless have
preserved linguistic abilities, Lenneberg suggested that the “absolute increase in
cell number and axodendritic density have increased man’s psychological storage
capacity” (Lenneberg 1967: 69) and other more general cognitive abilities, but not
our capacity for language. Although nanocephalic dwarves suffer general cogni-
tive deficits, they nonetheless acquire the rudiments of speaking and understand-
ing, and most master verbal skills to at least the level of five-year-old children.
Lenneberg concluded, correctly I think, that “the organization of the brain is more
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important for language than its mass” (Lenneberg 1967: 70). This conclusion is
consistent with most current thinking in neurolinguistics.
3.3. Molecular Genetics, Deep Homology and Paleo-DNA
I turn finally to a source of data that would probably have most astounded Lenne-
berg: the accurate sequencing of DNA recovered from long-extinct hominins like
Neanderthals and Denisovans (Green et al. 2010, Meyer et al. 2012). The general
progress made in genetics since Lenneberg’s time (genetic engineering, optogenet-
ics, personal genome sequencing, etc.) is by itself astonishing, and continues to
accelerate. But the notion that we would be able to recover DNA from an extinct
species in enough detail to begin reconstructing its phenotype seemed fanciful even
in 2000, after the first sequence data of the mitochondrial DNA from a Neanderthal
was reported (Krings et al. 1997). The reason is that each cell contains many mi-
tochondria (typically hundreds or thousands per cell), each of which has multiple
copies of the whole genome, meaning that there are typically thousands copies of
the mitochondrial DNA for each copy of nuclear DNA. The mitochondrial genome
is also much shorter than the nuclear genome, and is arranged on a circular chro-
mosome yielding greater stability. It is thus easier to piece together from the very
short sequences typically recovered from ancient DNA. For these reasons it initially
seemed likely mitochondrial DNA would be all we could ever extract and sequence
from fossils: useful but very far from complete.
But ten years afterward, due to improved sample quality, sequencing tech-
nology, and computational tools, the unimaginable became true and sequence data
covering much of the Neanderthal genome was reported (Green et al. 2010), with
the bombshell finding that a small amount of interbreeding had occurred between
Neanderthals and modern humans (cf. Pa¨a¨bo 2014). A few years later, a high qual-
ity full-coverage genome was released (Pru¨fer et al. 2014), which allowed a short
list of 87 genes with protein-coding differences between Neanderthals and our-
selves to be drawn up (see supplementary online material for Pru¨fer et al. 2014).
To the extent that we can interpret these genetic differences and similari-
ties, the Neanderthal genome offers an unparalleled opportunity to test hypotheses
about the existence of particular components of language in this extinct species, and
thus to derive inferences about the “protolanguage” that might have characterized
this species (cf. Fitch 2017). Our problem at present is that few genetic variants
have been isolated that can be definitively linked to any particular component of
language. However, one such example does exist already: the human-specific form
of the FOXP2 gene. This gene was first identified due to its mutation in a British
family, some of whose members suffer from developmental dypraxia specific to
oro-motor control, which leads to a severe developmental speech disorder despite
otherwise relatively spared cognitive and linguistic abilities (Vargha-Khadem et al.
1998, Vargha-Khadem et al. 2005). Since this discovery, multiple other individuals
with FOXP2 mutations and a similar phenotype have been discovered (Pa¨a¨bo 2014,
Graham & Fisher 2015).
The FOXP2 gene codes for a transcription factor (a protein that can bind to
DNA and thus modify the expression of other genes) connected with a rather large
network of associated genes that can be up- or down-regulated (Vernes et al. 2007).
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Crucially, in all modern humans, FOXP2 exists in a human-specific allele, coding
a protein that differs from that of chimpanzees (Enard et al. 2002). Within-species
homogeneity is just what we should expect for a gene causally associated with lan-
guage evolution (since humans around the world have the same capacity to acquire
any language), as is a difference from chimpanzees (which lack this capacity). Thus
FOXP2 has the appropriate characteristics required of a language-evolution-related
gene, albeit one that is tied to speech output capabilities rather than more central
linguistic characteristics like syntax.
Crucially, once the Neanderthal genome was sequenced, it was possible to
evaluate the sequence of FOXP2 in this species as well, and the Neanderthal gene
turned out to code for the same derived protein as in modern humans (Krause
et al. 2007). This strongly suggests that the selective event that led this derived
variant to be selected in our hominin ancestors preceded our divergence from Ne-
anderthals, a split which occurred roughly 500,000 years ago. Although it is im-
portant to note that no single gene alone underlies the derived human capability
for speech, this finding in turn suggests that selection for improved oro-motor se-
quencing also preceded this split, suggesting that increased oro-motor sequencing
abilities characterized our common ancestor with Neanderthals (cf. Fitch 2017).
This is obviously consistent with the hypothesis that this common ancestor had al-
ready acquired the capacity for speech. Finally, because the paleontological record
strongly suggests that Neanderthals did not have fully modern cognition (Tatter-
sall 2016), this suggests that this common ancestor, like Neanderthals, lacked some
other crucial component of language (e.g., hierarchical syntax or theory of mind, cf.
Bolhuis et al. 2014). Although no single gene by itself can explain language, or even
key sub-components of language like oro-motor sequencing or dendrophilia, this
case of FOXP2 provides a promissory note for future, similar genetic investigations,
rather than a complete story in itself.
Of course, the complexity of the mapping between genes, development, and
cognitive abilities is highly indirect and complex (DeSalle & Tattersall 2017, Fisher
2017), and we should not let the excitement about FOXP2 above obscure the fact
that most of the known genes associated with language and language disorders
have less clear and striking phenotypic effects. Any single gene acts in a context
provided by other genes, and its effects often vary from tissue to tissue, and prob-
ably differ in different brain regions. It is also important to note that many genetic
changes relevant to evolution result in changes in gene regulation during develop-
ment rather than protein-coding changes in the gene product. Indeed, outside of
the protein-coding portion of the FOXP2 gene, a modification of a putative regu-
latory region has been discovered which is not shared with Neanderthals (Maricic
et al. 2013), suggesting that there may have been waves of selection on this gene,
and the most recent one is unique to Homo sapiens. We have a long way to go be-
fore even this single gene is understood, much less the multiple changes in many
genes, related to multiple different mechanisms, that must have accompanied the
evolution of language.
Nonetheless, this new source of paleo-genetic data clearly refutes the all-to-
common notion that “we will never know” what happened when during hominin
evolution, and opens the prospect of testing competing models of language evolu-
tion empirically. Lenneberg would be amazed.
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Although many other genes besides FOXP2 have been proposed to be asso-
ciated with human language abilities (Graham & Fisher 2015, Mozzi et al. 2016),
none of these candidates yet has both the clear phenotypic identification and the
pattern of within-human homogeneity and human/chimpanzee differences that
would be required to firmly identify it as a language-related gene. Fortunately,
however, the process of identifying and isolating gene variants in individuals is
now part of normal clinical genetic practice and individualized genomics, so we
can confidently await more examples in the coming years. For each of these can-
didate genes, we can immediately cross-reference with the Neanderthal genome
(and paleo-genomes from other extinct hominins) to see if they shared the modern
human allele or not, and build a clearer and clearer picture of what the (already
known) genetic differences between us, Neanderthals, and chimpanzees actually
mean for development and the human phenotype. Thus, in my opinion, the most
promising data-driven pathway for examining the linguistic (and other cognitive)
abilities of Neanderthals and other extinct hominins is by examining their DNA.
4. Conclusion
In this paper I have attempted to revisit some of the key notions discussed by
Lenneberg in his ground-breaking book from a modern, empirical perspective. Al-
though, in many ways, Lenneberg was on the right track, and new sources of data
have simply reinforced points he made fifty years ago, in others his conclusions
have been updated, challenged or even rejected. In sum, however, I think it is fair
to say that the broad, data-driven approach that he pioneered, firmly based in both
the biology and linguistics of his time, has aged well. There is still much to be found
in his book that remains of value for biolinguists today.
In addition, I tried in the second part of this essay to show how far the field
of biolinguistics has come since Lenneberg’s time, building on a set of questions he
was one of the first to cogently ask, and within a framework he laid out beautifully
in the late 1960s. I believe that, were he alive today, Lenneberg would be pleased
by this progress, and excited by the prospects for the future.
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